Game Theory
Fudenberg, Game Theory
Game theory is famous for difficulty in economics.
I Static Games of Complete Information
1. Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium
1.1 Introduction to Games in Strategic Form and Iterated Strict Dominace
1.2 Nash Equilibrium
1.3 Existence and Properties of Nash Equilibria
2. Iterated Strict Dominance, Rationalizability, and Correlated Eqilibrium
2.1 Iterated Strict Dominace and Rationalizability
2.2 Correlated Equilibrium
2.3 Rationalizability and Subjective Correlated Equilibria
II Dynamic Games of Complete Information
3. Extensive-Form Games
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Commitment and Perfection in Multi-Stage Games with Oberved Actions
3.3 The Extensive Form
3.4 Strategies and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Gaems
3.5 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
3.6 Critiques of Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
4. Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The Principle of Optimality and Subgame Perfection
4.3 A First Look at Repeated Games
4.4 The Ruinstein-Stahl Bargaining Model
4.5 Simple Timing Games
4.6 Iterated Conditinonal Dominace and the Rubinstein Bargaining Game
4.7 Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria
4.8 Finite-Horizon and Horizon Equilibria
5. Repeated Games
5.1 Repeated Games with Observable Actions
5.2 Finitelty Repeated Games
5.3 Repeated Games with Varying Opponents
5.4 Pareto Perfection and Renegotiation-Proofness in Repeated Games
5.5 Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information
5.6 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
5.7 Changing the Inforamtion Structure with the Times Period
III Static Games of Incomplete Information
6. Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium
6.1 Incomplete Information
6.2 Example 6.1: Providing a Public Good under Incomplete Information
6.3 The Notions of Type and Strategy
6.4 Bayesian Equilibrium
6.5 Further Examples of Bayesian Equilibria
6.6 Deletion of Strictly Dominated Equilibria
6.7 Using Bayesian Equilibria to Justify Mixed Equilibria
6.8 The Distributional Approach
7. Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design
7.1 Examples of Mechanism Design
7.2 Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle
7.3 Mechanism Design with a Single Agent
7.4 Mechanisms with Several Agents: Feasible Allocations, Buget Balance, and Efficiency
7.5 Mechanism Design with Several Agents: Optimization
7.6 Further Topics in Mechanism Design
IV Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
8. Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and Termbling-Hand Perfection
8.1 Introductin
8.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Multi-Stage Games of Incomplete Information
8.3 Extensive-Form Refinements
8.4 Strategic-Form Refinements
9. Reputation Effects
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Games with a Single Long-Run Player
9.3 Games with Many Long-Run Players
9.4 A Single "Big" Player against Many Simultaneous Long-Lived Opponents
10. Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Information
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Intemporal Price Discrimination: The Single-Sale Model
10.3 Intertemporal Price Discrimination: The Rental of Repeated-Sale Model
10.4 Price Offers by an Informed Buyer
V Advanced Topics
11. More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance
11.1 Strategic Stability
11.2 Singaling Games
11.3 Forward Induction, Iteraged Weak Dominance, and "Burning Money"
11.4 Robust Predictions under Payoff Uncertainty
12. Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games
12.1 Generic Properties of Nash Equilibria
12.2 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Action Spaces and Discontinuous Payoffs
12.3 Supermodular Gaems
13. Payoff-Relavant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium
13.1 Markov Equilibria in Specific Classes of Games
13.2 Markov Equilibria in General Games: Definition and Properties
13.3 Differential Games
13.4 Capital-Accumulation Games
14. Common Knowledge and Games
14.1 Introduction
14.2 Knowledge and Common Knowledge
14.3 Common Knowledge and Equilibrium
14.4 Common Knowledge, Almost Common Knowlede, and the Sensitivity of Equilibria to the Information Structure
Use
This is one part of ULA.
Game Theory is general Optimization with control.